17

The short answer is no, this doesn't violate the law of cause and effect because the mind itself is a physical entity. Your thought experiment hinges on the debate of materialism (the mind is a physical thing) versus dualism (the mind is a different kind of thing than physical things). Most cognitive scientists believe that materialism is the correct view.


13

There a are globally two perspectives the discrete perspective uses a categorization system. There are many different systems, with more or less core emotions and sub-emotions. As the one shown in your post. the dimensional perspective considers one, mainly two, sometimes more, scales to identify an emotional value. Valence (happy/sad) and arousal (sleepy/...


11

It's possible to instill a false memory, even a traumatic one, in an adult. Children have been known to be more susceptible to suggestion since the 19th century (Binet, 1900, 1905). Here are some example references of memory implantation: Porter, S., Yuille, J. C., & Lehman, D. R. (1999). The nature of real, implanted, and fabricated memories for ...


10

It is alexithymia if you're looking for a diagnostic term. It is not a case of "you either have it or you don't—alexithymia is a continuum. There even exists a scale, which is a professional scale so to get it you need to pay for it and be a researcher. It's called Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20).


10

The Computational Theory of Mind is not that the mind does some form of computation in the wide sense of computation. Rather, look at the examples for the CToM given in the Wikipedia article; people like Fodor, Pinker, Marr. Their view is very much the opposite to the Connectionist position of West Coast scientists like Rumelhart, Elman and McClelland. Both ...


10

This question becomes more complicated if we think in terms of "emotions" (e.g., angry, happy, sad, afraid, etc.) than in terms of "affect" (positive and negative feelings, high and low arousal). I'll start with affect and move on to emotions. An affective state tags an object with a certain value--and it does so very quickly (e.g., Pham, 2007). For ...


9

It is not that we are just generally smarter then animals, but we posses cognitive tools of a different kind that they don't. Two of them are language and the ability to simulate the future. Regarding language, there is a wide consensus today that human language has some unique complexities that no animal form of communication has (see Pinker's "The ...


9

It appears that there's been a lot of research done by USC professor Antonio Damasio on the importance of emotions. There's some fascinating case studies and interviews that are worth reading and listening to, but the short summary, as I understand it, is: Emotions are important because they end up directing reason. Without emotion, there are simply too ...


8

In general, there are two types of 'complexity' that are studied. Usually, when people talk about 'complexity', especially on the internet, they mean Santa Fe Institute style complexity. This is a vague and poorly defined concept that has struggled for a number of years without making significant progress. It uses pretty words, but has yet to deliver on any ...


8

For more recent work on false memories, look at this paper. The authors provide a biological basis for false memories. They also implant false memories in mice. Source Steve Ramirez, Xu Liu, Pei-Ann Lin, Junghyup Suh, Michele Pignatelli, Roger L. Redondo, Tomás J. Ryan, and Susumu Tonegawa. Creating a False Memory in the Hippocampus. Science, 26 July 2013: ...


8

Perhaps you are looking for blunted affect? Wikipedia's definition goes like this (article has been updated since): Blunted affect is a clinical term to define a lack of emotional reactivity (affect display) in an individual. It manifests as a failure to express feelings either verbally or non-verbally, especially when talking about issues that ...


8

Answer Yes, theoretically. Now According to my ongoing informal research, there are two sides of brain preservation innovation: 1) the preservation and mapping (building) the connectome; and 2) the reinstantiation of memories and/or creating consciousness from a connectome. From http://www.brainpreservation.org/overview/: [N]euroscience is now identifying ...


7

[Edit]: Parts of this answer respond to removed content in older versions of the OP, and to comments. The current version of the OP deserves some elaboration of this answer. (And, IMHO, other answers too!) There are other spiritual "worlds" than those that are dualistic. By common psychological definitions of spirituality, the existence of an "...


7

Introduction Your thoughts seem to straddle panpsychism and computationalism. It is also possible you are just raising a question about physicalism: "if mental thoughts are a result of physical interactions, then why would consciousness be limited to things with brains?". Well, the short answer is that it's fundamentally not, but neither is a ...


7

This is partially an aspect of the binding problem. Sensory information arrives in parallel as a variety of heterogeneous hints, (shapes, colors, motions, smells and sounds) encoded in partly modular systems. Typically many objects are present at once. The result is an urgent case of what has been labelled the binding problem. We must collect the hints, ...


7

At some level, it's true that psychology reduces to biology and chemistry. If it didn't, then the widely-accepted view of physicialism/materialism would be wrong. But just because psychology can (in theory) be reduced to biochemistry, reductionism may not be the most productive way to approach the problem, for a couple of reasons: The causes of ...


7

This question is very similar to others on this forum, and I think almost everything in the question is answered there. Does something exist separate from the physical body? I don't think you will find the answer to that question in cognitive science, but rather in philosophy. Taken from one of the answers: Your thought experiment hinges on the debate ...


6

Don't know the answer (I think no one does), but you should have a look at this paper: A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. O'Regan JK, Noë A., BBS 2001 PUBMED In short the proposed answer is that modalities are subject to different sensory-motor contingencies. For example, when you move forward the visual input undergoes very ...


6

what has always puzzled me is the neurobiological basis that gives rise to the phenomenon that we associate our bodies with ourselves – i.e., why does my brain think of my physical body as "me" and make me care for it? In other words, why is me me at this particular point in time and not some other body living e.g. centuries ago? Why do I not ...


6

I disagree with @Josh (and all the other answers) that a materialist viewpoint is required to resolve this apparent contradiction. Firstly, we should not infer that the thought caused the tear. As an example, if I were to press the PrintScreen key on my keyboard, then a popup message would appear on my screen saying "printing to deskjet printer" and then ...


6

Overall, while there are developing cognitive neuroscience theories of how hypnotic states are produced, there does not appear to be any known cognitive neuroscience basis for individual differences in hypnotic susceptibility based on a reasonable Google Scholar, Web of Science and Scopus search on the topic. There is at least some evidence to suggest that ...


6

Note: This is not intended to set a verbosity standard for answers, but to give a comprehensive example of what kind of information I am looking in order to further clarify the question. An answer including only a parallel of the principles of ecological psychology subsection would be sufficient, for example. Ecological psychology Ecological Psychology (EP)...


5

Might be Uncanny Valley The uncanny valley is a hypothesis in the field of human aesthetics which holds that when human features look and move almost, but not exactly, like natural human beings, it causes a response of revulsion among some human observers. Examples can be found in the fields of robotics,1 3D computer animation,[2][3] and in medical fields ...


5

The experience machine is meant to be an argument against hedonism in that it's supposed to show that humans value other things than happiness and therefore wouldn't/shouldn't hook themselves up to the machine (whether it succeeds in doing this is another matter; Nozick simply points out that it would be "absurd" for anyone to connect oneself to the machine, ...


5

Of course the mind is not independent of the brain. Otherwise, nobody would do recreational drugs, psychiatric drugs would be useless, and our whole theory of light and color perception, sound perception, and every other sensory perception would be useless and make no predictions. All of these things tell us how signal in the environment are transduced ...


5

The question that you are referring to is worded in a way that I think is leading to the confusion. The question in the title is "Can the mind affect the brain?" but in the question body the final question posed is "Does [a thought producing a tear] not contradict the (physical) law of cause and effect?". The answer is yes to the title question: the mind ...


5

Are emotions really necessary for survival? No, not for survival; lots of living things around us without even a brain. Did emotions provide an evolutionary advantage in the past? The areas of the brain we associate with emotion were around far back in our evolutionary past - long before conscious reasoning appeared. Emotions are still an important part ...


5

Your question is about the hard problem of consciousness, which is basically the question of how qualia can be explained in a mechanistic way. As alluded to by the name of the problem, it's hard to give a satisfactory answer. The answer right now is: we don't know. There are some theories about how qualia and consciousness could have a neural basis (see this ...


5

It is generally accepted that all activity having to do with conscious experience is mediated by spiking in the cortex. Sub-threshold activity, such as excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) are not carried forward in the nervous system and will 'fade' before having an effect. It all revolves around action potentials. Quoting from Kandel et al. (2000): ...


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